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Lawrence 0. Gostin

The threat posed by avian influenza appears to be
rising, yet global and national health programs are
preparing only fitfully. A lethal form of avian flu has
rooted itself deeply into the poultry flocks of poor
Asian countries that will have a hard time eradicating it. Every so often a sick bird infects a human,
who usually dies from the encounter, and on rare
occasions the virus seems to have spread from one
person to another before the chain of infection dies
out. All it would take to set off a raging global pandemic would be for the virus to mutate into a form
that is readily transmissible among humans.'
evere Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) garnered a great deal of public attention because it
was novel and its potential for spread was unknown. However, the SARS corona virus is significantly
less virulent than pandemic influenza viral infections.
The annual number of deaths for seasonal influenza is
36,000 people in the United States and 250,000500,000 worldwide. However, highly pathogenic influenza pandemics have occurred roughly 2-3 times
per century, causing untold morbidity and mortality.2
The Spanish influenza pandemic of 1918 was believed
to have caused over 20 million deaths in a world less
than one-third the size of the current global population; 3 modern epidemiologists now estimate that over
50 million people died. Moreover, these deaths did not
occur primarily among infants and old people, as suggested by conventional wisdom. Approximately half the
deaths were among people in the prime of their lives. As
John Barry explains in his recent book, "One cannot
know with certainty, but if the upper estimate of the
death toll is true as many as 8 to 10 percent of all young
adults then living may have been killed by the virus.
4
And they died with extraordinary ferocity and speed."
There are three essential prerequisites for an influenza pandemic: (1) the identification of a novel viral
subtype in animal populations such as swine or poultry,
(2) viral replication causing disease in humans, and (3)
efficient human-to-human transmission. 5 The species
"jump"from animals to humans could occur through a
process known as "reassortment." If a person is exposed
to both animal and human viral infections, the "genetic
mixing" could lead to a strain that is transmissible
human-to-human, sometimes in ways that are highly
resistant to vaccination or antiviral treatment. InLawrence Gostin, JD, LL.D. (Hon.) is the John CarrollResearch ProfessorofLaw, Georgetown Un iversity; Professorof
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fluenza A (H5N1), the viral strain responsible for the
ongoing avian influenza outbreaks, has a worrying capacity to jump species, infecting cats and pigs, as well
as, in the laboratory, ferrets and mice.6
Since 1997, the first two prerequisites - a novel viral
strain in animals and transmission from animals to humans - have been met on numerous occasions. Although probable human-to-human transmission of a
virulent strain of avian influenza has occurred, it has not
yet been shown to be highly efficient.
From late 2003 through October 2004, outbreaks of
highly pathogenic influenza A (H5N1) occurred among
poultry throughout Asia 7 and parts of North America.,
More than 200 million birds and other domesticated
fowl have been culled or have died from the infection,
including farms in the United States. 9 The severe economic and trade impacts are illustrated by CDC and
USDA orders for a ban on the import of all birds (Class:
Aves) from affected areas in Southeast Asia. 10 Similar
restrictions were placed by countries in Europe and
Asia on imports of U.S. poultry. During the A (H5N1)
outbreaks of 2004 alone, there were 43 human cases,
with extraordinarily high mortality rates; 31 ofthese individuals died.,, The avian influenza outbreaks have
provoked fears of an influenza pandemic reminiscent of
the great plagues in world history.12
The lack of reliable vaccine production, even for "routine" seasonal epidemics, has increased fears of lethal
forms of influenza. The United States, for example, is
experiencing extreme shortage of influenza vaccine for
the 2004-05 season. Chiron Corporation - one of two
manufacturers working on a vaccine for human bird flu
- had its license to make conventional flu vaccine temporarily suspended by the British government in early
October 2004. Chiron had been expected to provide 4648 million doses of the vaccine, about half of the nation's supply. Chiron is currently the subject of a criminal investigation and is facing a shareholder derivative
lawsuit relating to the vaccine shortage. 13 Responses to
the shortage within the United States are varied, including the promulgation of emergency orders making
it a misdemeanor to administer a flu shot to an individual not in an identified risk category, imposing
penalties for price gouging, and the decision of various
health insurers to cover an alternate (FluMist) vaccine. 14 This is not the first time that the availability of
influenza vaccines has been delayed, and, for decades,
health experts have been issuing warnings concerning
the fragility of the nation's vaccine supply and precarious dependence on a very low number of vaccine producers.15
There is now intense interest in influenza preparedness, with major planning initiatives being undertaken
by the World Health Organization (WHO) and Insti-

tute of Medicine (IOM).'6 The potential for pandemic

spread of a "fit"influenza strain leads to intriguing ethical and legal questions about public health interventions that could severely disrupt trade, economics,
travel, and personal liberty. National and global public
health agencies have mooted a wide range of interventions, asking such penetrating questions as: Should intrusive powers be exercised? At what stage in the outbreak should interventions commence and with what
safeguards? How can vaccines and antiviral medications be produced reliably and delivered efficiently and
fairly to large populations? Planning for the next pandemic includes not simply influenza but other novel
infections, both naturally occurring and intentionally
7
created.
This article examines the principal therapeutic and
non-therapeutic public health interventions for preventing or ameliorating pandemic influenza. (See
Table). In each case, the hard, yet inevitable, legal and
ethical questions are explored. Thereafter, the article
provides several ethical values that can help evaluate
public health interventions in anticipation of the next
global health emergency.

Public Health Interventions to Prevent
or Ameliorate Pandemic Influenza
Animal/Human Interchange
Scientists consider live bird markets, traveling poultry
workers, and the movement of domestic poultry and
fighting cocks to be the most likely vectors for spreading A (H5N1) from farm to farm and country to country.1 8 Consequently, a critical early preventive strategy
is to control animal populations and prevent the species
jump from animals to humans. Humans are highly vulnerable to animal infections due to the close proximity
of animal and human populations in farming and distribution of poultry and meat. 9 Strategies to diminish
the risk include separation of animal and human populations; occupational health and safety in animal work
(e.g., infection control and disinfection); and control of
diseased or exposed animal populations (e.g., culling).
The international community faces daunting problems in implementing these strategies. International
food safety law does not emphasize animal/human interchange. The Codex Alimentarius Commission, administered by the WHO and the Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO), regulates food hygiene and labeling. Codex's main concern is with the safety of the food
supply and fair standards for international trade in
food.20 Occupational health and safety rules are primarily found at the national level, and country safe-

guards are highly variable. Countries may have a selfish interest in continuing intensive farming and food
distribution. These methods are cost-effective from an
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Table
Public Health Interventions: Purposes andValues
Purposes and

Public Health
ELervenL

IUn

I'

olectves

Strategies to Achieve

hicaF1ssues and

ruDlic I-ealtn rurpose

iRecommendations

Separation of animals and
humans; occupational health
and safety; control of
diseased animals
Cover all threats of global
importance; prompt country
reporting; use "small-world
networks"

Safeguard economic interests
in farming while protecting
the public's health

AnimallHuman Interchange

Prevent "species jump" by
reducing proximity of
animals and humans

Global Surveillance

iTimely and systematic
:monitoring of health
threats

Case Contact Investigations

Prevent spread of infection

Offer counseling, vaccination, Conduct investigations with

to contacts of infected or
exposed persons

and/or treatment to infected sensitivity and respect for
individuals and their contacts
or exposed persons

Stable Vaccine Supply

Vaccination and Medical
Treatment

Community Hygiene

Travel and Border Controls

Ensure privacy safeguards
for individuals and protection
of groups

Create incentives for private Balance public/private interests in intellectual property,
industry through public/
liability, and economic
private partnerships
investment
Prophylaxis, amelioration of 'Offer or require vaccination Balance bodily integrity with
:or antiviral therapy to at-risk common good; ensure fair alsymptoms, and/or reduced
location of scarce resources;
or infected persons
infectiousness
make therapeutics available
to developing countries
Assure stable vaccine
supplies for endemic and
pandemic influenza

Health education and hand
washing, disinfection, masks,
ventilation, and avoidance
of contacts
Prevent cross-border spread Travel advisories; border
restrictions; regulation of
of infectious disease
conveyances; stop lists
Promote safer behaviors
among the population

Balance health benefits with
costs and cultural sensitivities; ensure equitable
access
Health is salient; avoid un,necessary restriction of
;trade; safeguard against
discrimination

Decreased Social Mixing!
Increased Social Distance

Increase social distance to
avoid rapid spread of infection in public settings

Close civic activities, meeting Avoid heavy costs and diminished freedoms; deliver
places, and transportation
services to the vulnerable
systems

'Civil Confinement

Separate the infected or
exposed from the healthy

Isolation, quarantine,
cordon sanitaire

economic perspective but do not necessarily result in
safe practices to prevent animal-to-human transmission of disease.
Even if strong international health standards did
exist, public health authorities would continue to face
the problem ofwhen to implement aggressive strategies
such as culling. Premature interventions have profound
economic implications affecting livelihoods and trade.
However, weak or tardy interventions risk devastation
to animal and human populations.
GlobalSurveillance
Surveillance of novel infections in humans offers early

Provide due precess; ensure
safe and humane setting;
consider compansation; gain
public's trust

warning and provides an opportunity for a timely response. Experts recommend various surveillance activities, many of which were used in the 2003 SARS
outbreaks: testing and screening; health questionnaires, notices, and declarations; fever monitoring (selfmonitoring, thermal scanning); and reporting and
monitoring trends .21
Despite its importance, many countries do not conduct effective and timely surveillance. Prompt notification of an infectious disease threat can affect a country's tourism, trade, and prestige. Consequently, some
governments do not respond promptly to WHO requests for information. Many countries, moreover, lack
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the infrastructure and resources to conduct surveillance. As a result, national surveillance activities are
highly variable.
The International Health Regulations (IHR) are the
principal rules covering the international spread of
infectious diseases. The IHR, however, do not apply to
influenza, but cover only three diseases: cholera, plague,
and yellow fever. Instead, the WHO Influenza Surveillance Network wvas established in 1952 to identify viral
strains to develop the next season's vaccinations.
The WHO is currently involved in intergovernmental negotiations to revise the IHR. The draft revised
IHR, if adopted, would significantly strengthen international rules for surveillance. The rules would apply to
all health threats of international importance; mandate country notifications; gather reports from unofficial sources; and provide for real-time event management.2 2 Global surveillance could further benefit from
.small-world networks" consisting of health professionals, scientists, and non-governmental organizations
continuously monitoring disease threats.2 3 It should be
possible to supplement the surveillance provided by official sources with multiple public/private sources
through the internet and other modern communication
facilities.
Although surveillance is an essential public health
strategy, even routine activities, such as reporting,
affect privacy because government collects sensitive
health information. Acute outbreaks can trigger more
extreme measures such as continuous monitoring of
certain populations such as health care workers, immigrants, and travelers. An outbreak of a novel influenza strain will inevitably raise questions about the
appropriate scope of government surveillance and its
affects on privacy. Surveillance needs to take place,
therefore, with privacy safeguards in place.
Case ContactInvestigations
Case contact investigation is a classical form of surveillance. It involves identifying infected or exposed persons and following their recent contacts. This provides
an opportunity to interrupt the spread of infection. Persons exposed or infected can be offered antiviral therapy as a prophylaxis or treatment. Those who are infectious or potentially infectious can be separated from
the healthy population.
Case contract investigation is ostensibly voluntary
because the "index case" is under no formal obligation
to reveal his or her contacts. Nevertheless, its use in
sexually transmitted infections, including HIV/AIDS,
has proved highly controversial. 2 4 The index case may
feel coerced into giving information, investigations pose
privacy risks, and individuals may experience stigma
and discrimination. These investigations, therefore,

need to be conducted with sensitivity and respect
for individuals and their family, friends, and associates.
Vaccination:Scientific Innovation
in a Market Economy
The dominant strategy for seasonal influenza is to use
vaccinations for susceptible groups. Recommended
vaccination of high-risk populations (e.g., children and
the elderly) has become standard in developed countries, and mass vaccination could be recommended in
the event of a more severe outbreak.
An influenza pandemic would necessitate "surge capacity" in the development and delivery of vaccines,
yet the prospects for assuring large-scale access appear
dim. Manufacturing capacity is sufficient to cover less
that 5% of the world's population. Even highly industrialized countries such as the United States have difficulty assuring a stable vaccine supply. Evidence for the
inability of the private sector to meet America's needs
for vaccines has mounted, as demonstrated by sequential IOM reports. 25 A handful of major vaccine manufacturers exist in the world today; there were four times
that number only 20 years ago. The problem is compounded with A (H5N1) virus because standard methods for making influenza vaccines are ineffective for
highly pathogenic strains.
Unreliability in the industry is fueled by a thicket of
patent, liability, and financial concerns. Developing
effective vaccines requires stable markets, venture capital, and economic incentives. Manufacturer investment costs may not be recouped if a pandemic does not
occur or if intellectual property rights are in dispute.
The industry could also be exposed to liability for adverse effects, even if lengthy clinical trials are undertaken (which would not be feasible in an emergency
situation).26 The unreliability of vaccine supply is problematic not only for civilian but also for military purposes. 27 What is urgently needed is an effective pub-

lic/private partnership to stimulate vaccine production.
The IOM Council recommends the establishment of a
National Vaccine Authority (NVA) to advance the development, production, and procurement of new and
improved vaccines of limited commercial potential but
of global public health need. 28
TherapeuticInterventions:PublicAcceptance
and Rationinga Scarce PublicGood
When vaccination is unavailable, public health authorities may use an antiviral medication such as Tamiflu.
Antiviral therapy can be used for prophylaxis, allevia29
tion of symptoms, and reduction of infectiousness.
Antivirals, however, are costly, in short supply, and may
be effective only if administered during the first two
days following the onset of symptoms.
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Therapeutic interventions raise distinct ethical and
legal concerns. Requiring competent adults to be vaccinated or treated for their own protection is an unpopular notion. Nevertheless, the law permits a reasonable interference with bodily integrity to prevent
3
harm to the community. o
Although officials have the legal authority to compel
vaccination or treatment to protect the public, the political and ethical dimensions underpinning such a decision are complex. There is a long history of opposition
to vaccinations among certain sections of the population. 31 Anti-vaccination sentiments are not alvays irra-

tional because immunizations can pose risks, as well as
confer benefits. Mass vaccination to avert an influenza
epidemic can go horribly N\Tong, as occurred with swine
flu in 1976. The CDC campaign to immunize the American population cost S134 million and caused GuillainBarre Syndrome in some vaccine recipients.32
Vaccination or treatment can confer considerable
benefit to the individual and, ultimateb, to a population. Pandemic influenza would likely result in a paucity
of vaccines and antiviral medications, raising the hard
problem of fair allocation of scarce resources. Which
ethical values should guide rationing decisions: private
need (treatment of the sick); public need (prevention
among vulnerable populations); maintenance of essential services (health care workers and "first responders"); or political influence (priority for those with
political connections)? Justice may require that therapeutic interventions be used to benefit the most people
possible, irrespective of their power or influence. This
would militate toward the use of "public need" as the
guiding ethical value. Therapeutics, therefore, would be
used primarily for prevention and targeted to those
who pose the greatest risk of transmission. The ethical
value of "public need" might also require use of therapeutics for emergency workers to ensure maintenance
of essential services and ongoing assistance to the public. This would place private need and political influence
lower on the priority scale.
The global reality is that rich countries will have
much less scarcity than poor countries. For example,
Europe and the North America have over 90% of the
world's vaccine production capacity, but less than 10%
of the global population. Countries with manufacturing
capacities can be expected to reserve scarce supplies for
their own populations, leaving poorer countries with
the most acute vaccine shortages. The ethical question
then arises as to whether developed countries would be
expected to forego some of their precious stockpile of
vaccines and antiviral medications for the sake of
poorer countries experiencing a higher burden of morbidity and mortality from influenza? One might argue
that it is in the richer country's self interest to do so

since infectious disease can travel across the globe. Ethical analysis would prove difficult - do developed countries have an obligation to reduce the burden of disease
in developing countries? If all human life has the same
worth, then it may be ethically desirable to devote therapeutic resources to poor regions experiencing higher
burdens of disease. This allocation of resources is likely
to have the maximum beneficial effect on morbidity
and premature mortality.
Community Hygiene
One of the most valuable means of infection control is
also the least intrusive. Health education to promote
safer behaviors such as hand washing, disinfection,
masks, ventilation, and avoidance of contacts can be
highly effective. Community hygiene, although largely
uncontroversial, can impose costs (e.g., purchasing and
distributing equipment) and cause social unrest (e.g.,
exaggerated concerns about health risks). Hygiene
measures are also culturally sensitive - notice the difference in mask-wearing habits in Asia compared with
North America and Europe.
Under what circumstances should public health
authorities issue a national recommendation for aggressive hygiene measures given the costs and cultural
expectations? Probably the most important concern
would be the cost effectiveness of the hygiene measure.
If a hygiene measure is clearly cost effective, then the
public has the right to know how to adopt that measure
in a safe way. Vulnerable members of the community
may also need economic and technical assistance to
ensure equitable access to essential hygiene measures.
If a measure is not cost effective, then public health
authorities have an obligation to inform the public
about the lack of effectiveness and the risks. In some
cases, such as the use of masks, the evidence for, or
against, effectiveness may be unclear. In such instances,
the principle of transparency may suggest that public
health officials state honestly the lack of conclusive
evidence, leaving the judgment to the individual.
Travel and Border Controls
One of the first instincts in the face of infectious disease
threats is to protect national borders. ConsequentlN,
international or national health agencies may issue
travel advisories, establish border restrictions, or regulate conveyances such as airplanes, ships, and trains.
They might similarly use "stop-lists" to prevent specified individuals or groups from traveling. The draft
revised IHR afford WHO considerable authority to
regulate international travel and control borders.
Travelers legitimately claim the right to know health
risks, but travel restrictions significantly affect tourism
and trade. Consequently, travel advisories can be polit-
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ically charged, as were WHO advisories concerning
SARS in Ontario, Canada. 33 A delicate balance exists
between trade and health. Indeed, the draft revised
IHR direct WHO to "provide security against the international spread of disease while avoiding3 unnecessary interference with international traffic." 4
When faced with the hard tradeoff between maximization of health or of trade, which should prevail
and why? Arguably, health should take precedence over
trade because of the fundamental value of human functioning and life itself. Despite the effects on tourism and
trade, the public has a legitimate interest in knowing if
there are health hazards in regions where they intend
to travel. National and international public health agencies have an obligation to take steps that are necessary
to prevent the spread of infection across borders. Thus,
it would be legitimate to prevent travel of a person who
poses a significant risk of transmission. What public
health authorities may not do is use infectious disease
control as a pretext for discrimination by targeting
individuals based on their nationality, race, religion, or
other status.
DecreasedSocialMixing/IncreasedSocialDistance
Most Americans take for granted their freedom to associate with others in a variety of social settings. Yet,
public health authorities could restrict social mixing
and increase social distance to avert a serious infectious disease threat. This might involve closures of civic
activities (e.g., schools, workplaces), meeting places or
large gatherings (e.g., sports events, theatres, and business meetings), and transportation systems (e.g., mass
transit and airlines). The purpose behind restrictions on
mixing is to prevent rapid spread of infection in settings
where multiple people congregate.
The United States Constitution affords individuals
the freedom to associate, but courts would likely defer
to reasonable regulation of congregate settings to
prevent transmission of infection.3' As with other interventions, closures entail heavy costs in lost revenue
as well as in diminished freedoms. When an infectious
disease outbreak deeply affects a society's everyday
activities, public health authorities will have to cogently
explain the need for such intrusive interventions and
gain the public's confidence before implementing them.
Critical legal and logistical questions loom: which
authority has the power to close a venue; what criteria
should be used to trigger a closure and when should the
restriction be lifted; and how will services be delivered
to vulnerable populations who may be at risk in an
isolated residence or shelter?
Civil Confinement
The potential for a mass outbreak raises the specter of

civil confinement to separate the infected or exposed
from healthy individuals. This might entail isolation of
infected persons, quarantine of exposed persons, or
quarantine of a geographic area (cordon sanitaire).
Civil confinements may take place in hospitals or other
institutions, or in a person's home. New conceptions to
separate the healthy from the infectious include "sheltering in place," which public health authorities analogize to a "snow day."
Many states modernized their public health statutes
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September
n1th, 2001.36 Public health law reform is necessary to
ensure that states and localities have the legal authority for isolation and quarantine. 37 In order to meet
constitutional standards, state law must have clear
criteria for the use of civil confinement and must offer
38
procedural due process.
Civil confinement, of course, raises powerful civil liberties concerns. Not only is isolation or quarantine a deprivation of liberty, but enforcement can sometimes be
intrusive. For example, during the SARS outbreaks,
some countries used electronic bracelets, web cameras,
and police to monitor and, at times, restrict the movement of individuals. It will also be important to ensure
that judicial hearings are available, particularly in a
mass outbreak. Isolation or quarantine will have to take
place in a humane and habitable environment. Vulnerable persons need to be protected against re-exposure
to infection, offered care and treatment, and guaran39
teed the necessities of life such as safe food and water.
There may also be the need to consider compensation
for lost work. Individuals are confined for the good of
the community and have to forego their livelihood and
other essential activities. Above all, public health authorities need to maintain the public's trust. To what extent would orders for civil confinement dissipate trust
and reduce cooperation?
Acting Under Conditions of Uncertainty:

The Key Scientific and Social Questions
Influenza pandemic preparedness requires careful consideration of the public health strategy as well as the
legal and ethical implications. Several key scientific
questions loom: Are specific interventions cost effective? What combination of measures is most cost effective? During what phase of the pandemic should
interventions be implemented? When should public
health measures be discontinued?
Although many of the foregoing interventions have
been widely used, many still lack adequate evidence of
cost effectiveness. Even if individual interventions are
known to be cost-effective, public health authorities
will have to form a judgment as to the combination of
measures that will be maximally effective. They will

JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE & ETHICS

Lawrence 0. Gostin

need to decide when to initiate and when to end an
intervention.
The decision to intervene is difficult because public
health authorities may be acting under conditions of
scientific uncertainty. It may be unclear whether serologic tests are reliable, vaccines or treatment are safe
and effective, and coercive interventions are acceptable to the population. To be effective, agencies may
have to intervene at the earliest stages, before the threat
level is clear. If interventions are well targeted and
timed, then public health officials may prevent untold
economic and human harm. However, if the interventions over-reach, officials will be accused of disregarding essential economic interests and fundamental
human rights.
These scientific questions are important because public health interventions do not take place in a vacuum.
They raise fundamental economic, political, and legal
questions that need to be considered:
Economics
As mentioned earlier, public health interventions can
have dire effects on the economy. They impede individual economic freedoms to travel and pursue a business or livelihood. They also affect local, national, and
regional economies by impacting trade, travel, tourism,
and agriculture. Countries may have built-in disincentives to conduct surveillance and response in an energetic and public way.
Political
Infectious disease outbreaks can have intense sociopolitical ramifications. Diseases affect a country's prestige as well as its economy, and the electorate may hold
politicians accountable. As a result, political leaders
may try to de-emphasize the threat or delay taking definitive action as occurred in numerous epidemics ranging from HIV/AIDS to SARS.
Legal and Constitutional
Infectious disease outbreaks take place in countries
with vastly different legal and constitutional traditions.
Public health planning may be undertaken within liberal democracies with full protection of human rights
or they may take place in less democratic, perhaps more
authoritarian, societies. During the SARS outbreaks,
for example, countries behaved very differently in their
response and protection of civil liberties.40 Infectious
diseases tend to bring out the best and worst in societies. History demonstrates the potential for over-reaction, stigma, and discrimination in the face of a severe
epidemic. 41 Consequently, the legal and constitutional
dimensions will be important in confronting a severe
epidemic)

Ethical Values Underpinning Public Health
Preparedness: The Cross-Cutting Issues
Public health authorities have a mandate to protect the
population's health. It is crucial, however, that they act
ethically. Ethical values are usually too broad to precisely determine whether an activity is morally appropriate. Nevertheless, it ought to be possible to enunciate several ethical values that can inform public health
practice, particularly in an emergency.
Transparency
The ethical value of transparency requires officials to
make decisions in an open and fully accountable manner. Government officials must be willing to make clear
the basis for public health measures. They should honestly and openly inform the public of what is known and
not known; openly acknowledge when new evidence
warrants reconsideration of policies; and educate the
public about the goals of intervention and the steps
taken to safeguard individual rights.
Protectionof VulnerablePopulations
Diseases that may differentially affect segments of the
population have usually imposed the additional burden
of social opprobrium. Public health officials may inadvertently amplify the process as they conduct their surveillance activities. While they may not be able to prevent stigmatization, officials have an obligation to take
steps to mitigate the suffering that may attend their efforts by underscoring the irrationality and inequity of
ethnic stereotyping. Consultation with representatives
of the communities most at risk will be important for
instrumental reasons and as an expression of social solidarity. Individuals should feel a sense of participation
in crucial decisions affecting their lives and communities. People place their trust in political leaders and, in
return, they deserve due consideration and respect for
their health and human rights.
FairTreatment and SocialJustice
Justice requires that the benefits and burdens of public health action be fairly distributed, thus precluding
the unjustified targeting of already socially vulnerable
populations. Equitable public health action is based on
science and assures reasoned population-based policies. Procedural justice requires a fair and independent
hearing for individuals who are subjected to burdensome public health action. Due process requirements
are inherently important because fair hearings affirm
the dignity of the person. Furthermore, due process is
instrumentally important because it best assures accurate decision-making.

2
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The Least Restrictive Alternative
International human rights law is guided by the principle of proportionality: i.e., interventions should be
necessary and proportional to the risk posed. 4 :3 Interventions should be the least restrictive alternative necessary to prevent or ameliorate the health threat. Requiring the least restrictive/intrusive alternative
represents a means to impose limits on state interventions consistent Ntith the traditions of privacy, freedom
of association, and individual liberties. The standard
does not require officials to utilize less-than-optimal
interventions. However, they must choose the least
intrusive alternative that can best achieve the health
objective.

The Public Health Paradox
There is no way to avoid the dilemmas posed by acting
without full scientific knowledge. Failure to move aggressively in the early stages of pandemic influenza can
have catastrophic consequences. Actions that prove to
have been unnecessary will be viewed as draconian and
based on hysteria. The only safeguard is the adoption
of ethical values in formulating and implementing public health decisions. Public health policy wvill reflect in
a profound way the manner in which humane societies
both implicitly and explicitly balance the common good
with respect for personal rights.
Disclaimer
Professor Gostin was a member of WHO's consultation on influenza
preparedness and is working with WHO on the revision of the International Health Regulations. He also participated in the IOM Workshop on preparing for the next pandemic. The views in this article do
not necessarily reflect those ofWHO or IOM. A shorter version ofthis
article appears in the Hastings CenterReport 34 (2004): 10-11.
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